Between Alternance and the Makhzen: At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah's Entry into Moroccan Politics
MICHAEL J. WILLIS
In 1997 members of the Islamist association At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah were elected to the national parliament in Morocco as members of an existing political party, the MPDC, which they joined after failing to obtain official permission to form their own political party. Once elected to parliament, the Islamist deputies adopted a policy of 'critical support' towards the new government of alternance led by parties from the long- standing opposition in Morocco. This policy meant that it remained generally supportive of the government but left it free to criticise it on particular issues. At- Tawhid's agenda commits it to democracy and non-violence, as well as efforts to improve conditions for Morocco's poor and to preserve Morocco's religious identity. It has had to balance strategic relations between the new government, more radical Islamist groups operating outside the political system and, most importantly of all, the Moroccan state - or Makhzen - which has allowed it into the system.
A small but noted aspect of the period of political change that Morocco witnessed in 1997-98 - which saw elections held at the local and national levels and the establishment of an opposition-dominated government under Abderrahmane El Youssoufi - was the entry of a section of Morocco's Islamist movement onto the legal and institutional political stage. In November 1997 members of the Islamist association At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah (Unity and Reform) were elected to the new lower house of the national parliament, having contested the election under the banner of the Mouvement Populaire Democratique et Constitutionnel (MPDC) with which At-Tawhid was formerly allied. In all, nine candidates from the MPDC (which subsequently changed its name to the Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (PJD)) took up seats in parliament following the election. This development represented Morocco's response to the conundrum most other states in the Muslim and Arab worlds had faced when deciding how - or indeed whether - to accommodate Islamist movements and opinions within legal political frameworks, especially during periods of political
Michael J. Willis is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Al Akhawayn University in Ilfrane, Morocco.
The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.4, No.3 (Autumn 1999) pp.45-80 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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change and liberalisation. The potentially dire consequences of mishandling this issue had made themselves apparent in neighbouring Algeria over the preceding decade. The modest scale of the Islamists' electoral advances was indicative of the cautious and incremental attitude towards political change and development that was shared by both the Moroccan regime and the Islamists themselves. The peaceful and low-key evolution of this new development prompts interest as to how this came about and in what possible future role Islamists and Islamism may play in Morocco's still- evolving political environment.
At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah
As an association, At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah is the cumulative product of a whole series of developments and realignments that occurred within Morocco's wider Islamist movement from the 1970s. Most of At-Tawhid's senior figures were originally members of Al-Shabiba Al-hlamiyya (Islamic Youth), the activist and militant Islamist organisation that grew in size and importance within Morocco during the mid-1970s. Al-Shabiba's increasing militancy and confrontational attitude towards the Moroccan regime, together with the mounting authoritarianism of the organisation's leader, Abdelkrim Mouti, led, however, to increasing strains within the grouping. These tensions culminated in a formal split from Al-Shabiba by a section of the organisation from Rabat in the early 1980s. The Rabat group renamed themselves Al-Jama 'a Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and in 1983 applied for official recognition as an Islamic organisation. From the outset, it was apparent that the new grouping was intent on breaking not only with Abdelkrim Mouti's leadership, but also with his whole approach when seeking the application of Islamic values and doctrines in Morocco. Whereas Al-Shabiba under Mouti's leadership had been renowned for its belligerence and criticism of the regime and had even been implicated in violence against its opponents, Al-Jama 'a adopted a very different approach. It both explicitly accepted the legitimacy of the Moroccan regime - fundamentally the monarchy - and renounced the use of violence. Emphasis was, instead, placed on the promotion of Islamic values through gradualist and peaceful means. As part of the new emphasis and strategy, Al-Jama 'a made clear to the Moroccan authorities that it wished to become a recognised part of Moroccan public life and thus break with the clandestine and subversive status of Al-Shabiba. Despite formally applying for legal recognition as an association in 1983, Al-Jama'a remained unrecognised and although tolerated by the authorities felt unable to be as publicly active as it would have liked. From the mid-1980s, the association's leaders began writing to
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senior figures within the government, attempting to explain the group's views and objectives. Eventually, in 1989, having received no response from the letters sent to ministers, the president of the association, Abdallah Benkirane, wrote to King Hassan II himself, explaining, in Benkirane's words, that: 'we were a group of people wanting to participate in the edification of the country, sharing the precepts close to our identity: Islam'.1 The key word here was 'participate'. Political changes in Morocco during this period had put increasing emphasis on the role of the country's political parties. In 1988 the leaders of Al-Jama'a had made the decision to try to enter politics. Aware that the authorities were wary of any organisation laying claim to Islam, Al-Jama'a formally changed its name in February 1992 to Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid (Reform and Renewal), which omitted the problematic reference to religion. Within weeks of this change of name the organisation announced the creation of a new political party, Hizb At-Tajdid Al-Watani (National Renewal Party) which in May 1992 applied for recognition as a political party in anticipation of elections for local government.2
The rejection by the authorities of the application for official recognition by Hizb At-Tajdid Al-Watani to become a political party and thus participate in elections did not, however, signal an end to the attempt by At-Tajdid to enter the formal political arena. The association began to explore the possibility of fielding candidates in elections under the banner of existing and officially recognised political parties. Such a tactic had been successfully adopted by Islamist organisations in other countries - most notably Egypt - where the establishment of explicitly Islamist political parties had been similarly blocked. The preferred option for many members of At-Tajdid was to come to some agreement with the Istiqlal party - the historic party of the struggle for independence. Istiqlal's ideological origins in the ideas of salafiyyism or Islamic reformism were seen as making the party the natural choice for some form of electoral partnership. For Abdallah Benkirane, Istiqlal represented 'strategically ... a formation close to the Islamist movements'.3 Ultimately, though, plans for such an alliance foundered on the Istiqlal's insistence that the members of Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid should join the Istiqlal as individuals rather than as a group - something the Islamic association was not prepared to agree to, preferring to retain its distinct identity as a group. Having failed to reach an arrangement with the Istiqlal, At-Tajdid was forced to look elsewhere for a suitable electoral partner and eventually found one in the shape of the Mouvement Populaire Democratique et Constitutionnel (MPDC) led by Dr Abdelkrim Khatib.
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Co-operation with the MPDC
Unlike the Istiqlal, the MPDC was not a major political force. It had not had members elected to official institutions at the national level for nearly 20 years and in the view of many observers it had simply become an 'empty shell' rather than an active political party. It had originally been created in 1967 by Khatib as a breakaway party from the Mouvement Populaire. Despite Khatib's standing as a leader in the independence struggle, a former minister in post-independence cabinets and one-time president of the Chamber of Deputies,4 the MPDC failed to make a significant impact on the Moroccan political scene. The party won just three seats in the 1977 elections to the national parliament, but failed to secure representation on any other occasion. In protest at what Khatib saw as electoral manipulation, the MPDC committed itself to boycotting elections, a position the party maintained into the 1990s. The first links were established between the MPDC and At-Tajdid in 1992-93. Discussions on co-operation finally culminated in the holding of an extraordinary Congress of the MPDC on 2 June 1996 which witnessed the formal entry of Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid into the party. The precise nature and terms of the new relationship were not made entirely apparent and has continued to remain ambiguous. Many observers saw the association as representing a straightforward takeover or coup d' etat by the Islamists against the largely moribund MPDC. Khatib and his supporters inevitably rejected such a characterisation. It was pointed out that Dr Khatib remained the president and leader of the party. For their part, Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid also sought to present the relationship in less absolute terms. Mustapha Ramid, one of the senior figures in the association, described the relationship in the following way: 'It is not a question of an integration, but rather a coalition founded on common interests and goals.'5 Integration implied the subsummation of Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid into the MPDC, something the Islamists were careful to stress had not occurred. The arrangement with the MPDC related only to the political aspects of their work. Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid would continue to exist and function in its own right as a distinct organisation. Abdallah Benkirane confirmed that: 'This affiliation does not mean the dissolution of our association, which will continue with its activities, but without being directly involved in politics.'6 This distinction was stressed to allow Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid to continue as an association in the event that the MPDC might be banned or dissolved by the authorities, thus leaving the Islamists without a legal organisational base.
The ideological basis of the new relationship was stated as being founded on a shared philosophy and objectives. Abdelkrim Khatib said his
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party had never hid its 'Islamic tendency' and that he shared much of the Islamists' desire to moralise Moroccan society.7 Publicly, the two organisations proclaimed that the conditions of the partnership were that both accept the central principles of recognition of the monarchy, renunciation of violence, working through politics to achieve change and work and action in the service of Islam. If the nature of the relationship between At-Tajdid and the MPDC was rather blurred, the purposes of it were made very plain. Following the MPDC Congress of June 1996, Benkirane announced: 'We now have a political party and we expect to participate in a limited way in the next general election.'8 The objective of finding a party political vehicle to contest elections had been achieved and the perceived isolation of the Islamist movement from the formal political processes had been broken. This breakthrough served to encourage other Islamist groupings and in the wake of the agreement with the MPDC, At-Tajdid merged with another like- minded organisation, Rabitat Al- Mostaqbal Al-Islamiyya (League of the Islamic Future) to form a new unified movement: At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah.9
The Local Elections
Within months of the entry of the Islamists into the MPDC, Morocco as a whole entered into a new political phase with the announcement by King Hassan II on 20 August 1996 of important changes to the constitution that would change, in particular, the structure of the national parliament. Such changes would open the way for fresh elections at both local and national level. This development presented the new alliance with its first electoral test, beginning with elections to the local communes scheduled for 13 June 1997.10 The local elections also provided the new partnership with its first genuine crisis. In May 1997, At-Tawhid announced in its newspaper its intention to contest the elections and began to nominate candidates under the banner of the MPDC. It therefore came as shock to all concerned when in the final period before the election, Abdelkrim Khatib formally declared that the MPDC would not, in fact, be fielding candidates in the election. The announcement was greeted with dismay by At-Tawhid, which saw its first major electoral opportunity being snatched away. Desperate attempts were made to persuade Khatib to reverse his decision about which they had not been consulted. However, the leader of the MPDC maintained that the party was insufficiently prepared to contest the election and had too few candidates. If the party was not able to contest at least two-thirds of the seats in the election (instead of the 10-15 per cent envisaged) then, in his view, it merely served to underline the exclusion of both the MPDC and the Islamists from the political system. Khatib had already been angered by the
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failure of the authorities to include his party in the National Commission charged with overseeing the running of the elections on the grounds that it, unlike the parties included in the Commission, had no representation in the existing national parliament." The alleged manipulation by the authorities of elections had been behind Khatib and the MPDC's long-running boycott of official elections - a stance Khatib appeared still unwilling to break with. Khatib's unwillingness to participate in the elections was, however, explained in other quarters by reference to the fears of members of the MPDC old-guard that the poll would seal their fate through the election of large numbers of members of At-Tawhid under the party's colours.12 The failure of attempts by At-Tawhid to dissuade Khatib led a number of figures within the association to question the wisdom of remaining inside the MPDC. However, other senior leaders counselled patience and restraint. As Benkirane subsequently commented:
Dr. Khatib is Dr. Khatib. He is the president of our party and he is more than seventy years old. We were obliged to accept his decision ... we are not going to force a split over something so small. Elections come and go but relations should be preserved ... If we had broken with Dr. Khatib with whom would we have participated now?13
It was also argued that although Khatib had eliminated the possibility of fielding candidates under the banner of the MPDC, Islamist candidates could still contest the election. At-Tawhid encouraged both members and sympathisers of the movement to present themselves as independent candidates at the election or to even try to stand for one of the other parties. The results of this strategy, which was put in to practice during the short period that remained before voting, were not insignificant. Around 100 recognisably Islamist-leaning candidates were elected on 13 June to serve on the local councils, three becoming commune presidents. Yet this figure represented a fraction of the 24,000 councillors elected that day; Islamists had contested just ten per cent of the electoral districts.
The Legislative Elections
The local elections of June 1997 served as a preliminary contest to the much larger affair of the national legislative election scheduled for the following November. For At-Tawhid this poll represented the real prize. Not only would it give the organisation the opportunity to elect members to the national platform, and thus give it a national voice and platform, but it would also allow At-Tawhid to demonstrate its commitment to peaceful and constitutional methods.
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From the outset, efforts were made to prevent a repeat of the events leading up to the local elections. The leaders of At-Tawhid met with Khatib and after what one was later to describe as 'a frank discussion', the president of the MPDC agreed that the party would field official candidates at the forthcoming elections.14 At-Tawhid's arguments were further reinforced by the fact that large numbers of Islamists had now formally joined the party. This intentionally tipped the balance of opinion among the rank-and-file decisively towards participation. Khatib explicitly acknowledged this factor himself when he stated that his decision to participate had been influenced by 'strong pressure from young people who had recently joined this movement and who ardently wished to become involved in parliamentary action'.15 The MPDC officially announced its participation in the elections at a press conference in Rabat on 1 November. It was acknowledged from the outset that the party's participation would be limited, but nevertheless MPDC candidates were registered for nearly half of the 325 electoral districts. The failure to enter candidates in every local contest was explained in terms of cost and the party's belief in only putting forward truly qualified candidates. Indeed, it was notable that teachers, lawyers and doctors featured heavily among the candidates presented by the MPDC, providing a significant contrast to many of the candidates from the other parties who were not necessarily known for their high levels of education. The party also chose candidates with established personal, family or professional connections with the districts they stood for. Any attempt to run candidates as independents was precluded by an official ruling announced in September that all candidates had to represent recognised political parties - a factor that had further sharpened At-Tawhid's determination to secure the MPDC's agreement to participate in the election. Having secured Khatib's agreement, the MPDC proceeded to start campaigning for the ballot, which would take place on 14 November. However, entering the elections appeared to be only the first hurdle that needed to be overcome on the way to securing representation in the House of Representatives. Not only did the MPDC find itself having to compete with the 15 other recognised political parties, but also it perceived that as a party it suffered from a number of unwarranted, but officially sponsored handicaps. Even before the election campaign began, the party had complained that the administration was not dealing with it on the same terms as the other parties. Much of this criticism sprung from the administration's judgement that preferential treatment should be shown to parties that had had representation in the previous parliament. As has been already shown, this meant that the MPDC (which had boycotted previous elections) had been excluded from representation on the National Commission charged with overseeing the 1997 elections. It also meant that
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the party received less exposure on national television during the election campaign (15 minutes as opposed to half an hour for the main parties) and less state aid (DM50 million against Dh300 million)16 than the other parties. Furthermore, in the official allocation of colours for each party (to aid party identification for the sizeable part of Morocco's electorate that was illiterate), rather than being allotted a colour of its own, the MPDC was given the colour of another party with just an added black stripe to distinguish it. All of these issues were the subject of bitter complaint from the MPDC and At-Tawhid even before the campaign begun. Once the campaign had begun, the party experienced further discrimination. Unable and largely unwilling to indulge in the vote-buying that had become an established part of Moroccan election campaigns in many areas, the MPDC was put at a disadvantage to most of the other parties. The MPDC's leaders were critical of what they termed the Administration's 'negative neutrality' in failing to prevent this 'electoral market'.17 Moreover, the party alleged that the authorities were actually directly intervening in the campaign to damage the MPDC's electoral chances. Mustapha Ramid, a senior figure in At-Tawhid and the MPDC candidate in Idrissia in Casablanca, was arrested by the police along with 13 of his supporters during the campaign and held for five hours before being released. The arrests followed a refusal to disperse a peaceful march that the MPDC had organised in Idrissia. Ramid, however, argued that similar marches had been organised by other parties and had not been stopped by the authorities.18 The party alleged that the authorities had intervened in a similar fashion in Sale, and that in Tetouan the local Wali had put pressure on the local MPDC candidate to withdraw from the election.19 In spite of these handicaps and restrictions, the MPDC campaigned for the election in a robust and enthusiastic manner. It made use of intensive and low-level campaigning techniques such as door-to-door canvassing in the urban areas where it had concentrated its candidates. Such an approach helped stress the party's desired image of being close to ordinary people and their concerns. The party's populist style of campaigning led one newspaper to remark that the party could offer its opponents 'a good lesson in political marketing' .20 The exact rewards these efforts would bring remained uncertain up until the day of the poll. A number of foreign diplomats observed that the party might secure enough support in some districts to entitle it to as many as 20 seats in the new parliament. However, it was acknowledged that such an advance would not be permitted by the authorities, who would make sure that the party gained probably no more than five seats.21 When the official results gradually became known on 15 November, it was shown that the MPDC had been credited with winning a total of nine
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seats. The party was quick to claim that nine seats was fewer than it was entitled to and moved immediately to officially protest the results in a further three seats.22 Nevertheless, it was clear that the MPDC and At- Tawhid were very pleased with even these restricted gains. Not only had the party secured representation at its first attempt, but also, as Abdelkrim Khatib declared at the post-election press conference held by the MPDC, the results demonstrated the clear popularity of the party. Even the official figures recorded that a quarter of a million electors had voted for the party and the party had elected members representing most of Morocco's main cities in parliament. MPDC candidates had been elected in Tetouan, Fes, Oujda, Agadir, Tangier and in four separate districts in Casablanca. The MPDC was not shy about publicising its success. The party published full details of its nine victories and -in a move in keeping with its populist election campaign - party candidates toured electoral districts thanking people for their support even in areas where the party had registered an official defeat. It was noticeable that none of the other parties bothered to do the same. The successes of the election did not remove the criticisms voiced during the campaign and the MPDC restated them clearly - notably those relating to vote-buying and official discrimination — in the wake of the results. However, the party's official reaction to the results was positive and an official statement from the party announced that:
the elections were run in very good conditions, and despite all the shortcomings, this vote constitutes a positive step on the route to democratisation and the establishment of a state of law.23
Relations with Other Parties
Participation in elections and consequent entrance into parliament brought the Islamists of At-Tawhid into direct contact with the other parties that made up Morocco's party political mosaic. This contact obliged the organisation to work out precisely what sort of relationship it wished to have with the political parties. There were a number of different and often conflicting considerations. It was clear that many in the association felt a certain basic antipathy to the other parties: as long-standing constituent parts of what was seen as a fundamentally corrupt political system, the parties were viewed by many in At-Tawhid as sharing the blame for the ills of Morocco. Such a judgement led many in the association to conclude that contacts with the other parties should be kept to a minimum. There were also powerful political and strategic motivations for a certain distance to be maintained from the other parties. The leaders of both At-Tawhid and the MPDC were aware that their view of the other parties was shared by a large
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part of the Moroccan population. It thus made good political sense to portray the MPDC as being a party that stood apart and distinct from the existing party political system and which could offer a genuine and unsullied alternative to the current political order. In spite of the clear ideological and political reasons for not wanting to establish such close relations, there were also factors that pulled in the opposite direction and which indicated that there were gains to be had from links with the other parties. Although the November 1997 election had represented an undeniable advance for both the MPDC and At-Tawhid, the fact remained that they had only nine representatives among 325 in the House of Representatives - not even a presence sufficient to deserve recognition as an official group in the chamber.24 It was therefore clear that if the parliamentary presence was to be anything more than a platform for expressing views, co-operation with the other parties in parliament would be unavoidable. On a broader level, it was realised that co-operation also served the purpose of reinforcing At-TawhicTs desired image as a moderate and tolerant political force - far removed from the extremism and exclusivity that characterised (in both the popular and official mind) many Islamist movements. These conflicting considerations had been put to their first serious test during the elections. In the run-up to the poll a highly mixed set of messages emerged from senior figures in At-Tawhid and the MPDC with regard to the other parties, reflecting the contrasting strategic considerations. Statements about the other parties were thus frequently ambiguous and at times plainly inconsistent with each other. In September 1997 Benkirane declared to a newspaper:
Our participation in the elections will be limited ... because we are convinced that we represent only a part of national political life and that the other political parties represent a real weight in our country.25
In making such a statement Benkirane was possibly seeking to correct a statement he had made just a year earlier in which he had claimed that Morocco's political parties were not true political parties and that they simply sought power and privileges.26 Such previously critical views, however, were reiterated just a few weeks later by another senior figure in At-Tawhid and a candidate in the election, Mustapha Ramid, who himself declared to a newspaper that the other parties had 'nothing to propose to our [i.e. the Moroccan] people'.27 The apparently inconsistent line towards the other parties was not primarily due to conflicting strategic priorities or indeed to differences between the views of different leaders. It also had much to do with events that occurred during the election campaign itself. The MPDC's criticisms of
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the administration's role in the election campaign were more or less matched by their criticisms of the behaviour and practices of the other parties during the period. The fundamental allegation against the other parties was the endemic practice of purchasing votes, which the MPDC took every opportunity to condemn and protest against. A more serious allegation was the use of violence by members of other parties against supporters of the MPDC. In Kenitra, for example, the party claimed that its candidate had been attacked and injured by members of the Mouvement Democratique et Social (MDS).28 Inevitably, the MPDC itself did not escape accusations of malpractice coming from the other parties. The leftist Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS) asserted that the MPDC had involved itself in the traffic of electoral cards notably in the Bab Jdid constituency in Casablanca.29 A more common charge, mainly from the Istiqlal and the USFP {Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires) was that the party had made unfair and illegal use of mosques during the election campaign.30 Much attention focused during the campaign and in its immediate aftermath on relations between the MPDC and the Istiqlal and the USFP. As the two largest parties in the opposition Kutla (Bloc) alliance of parties which was expected to form the basis (as indeed it eventually did) of a post- election government, the Istiqlal's and USFP's stance towards the Islamists was closely followed. As has been indicated, the Istiqlal had long been perceived by Islamists as a party broadly sympathetic with their views and had been the acknowledged preferred choice as an electoral partner for At- Tawhid. Despite the failure of this option, good relations were preserved between the two groups (the accusation concerning the use of mosques notwithstanding) and until early 1998 the Istiqlal remained the only party whose leaders had met with the leaders of At-Tawhid. Relations between the USFP and the MPDC/At-Tawhid were a more complex affair. The elections had created a number of tensions between the two. The MPDC's principal complaint against the larger party when the results had become known was that USFP candidates had been unfairly credited with victory in at least two electoral districts which the MPDC was convinced it had won. On the part of the USFP, in addition to the accusation that mosques were being used for 'political purposes', which constituted 'an attempt to destabilise Moroccan society',31 there was the insinuation in the party's press that the MPDC had attempted fraud against the USFP in Hay Hassani.32 In spite of these mutual allegations, the USFP appeared anxious to placate its Islamist rivals. In one case, where the USFP had been accused of being unfairly credited with victory in the elections, the USFP's 'victorious' candidate supported the accusation and demanded a re-run of the vote in the
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constituency, clearly implying that the original result had been 'arranged' by the Administration.33 Similarly, although there had been unofficial suggestions from the party that the MPDC had attempted electoral fraud, the official report by the USFP on the elections declared that the MPDC was one of the few parties that had not been guilty of any wrong-doing during the election.34 During the campaign, senior USFP figures had referred in positive terms to the party when questioned by the media. Abderrahmane El Youssoufi, the USFP's leader, said that the MPDC's participation was 'a contribution to the opposition'35 and that:
The party of the Islamist tendency seems to have positioned itself in the camp of the opposition. We consider it as an objective ally. We wish that the results that this party obtains will contribute to the work of change in the country.36
The New Government
The eventual appointment of Abderrahmane El Youssoufi in February 1998 as prime minister of the post-election government prompted speculation about how this would affect relations with the MPDC as an 'objective ally'. The USFP had emerged as the largest party in parliament following the November election, but remained a long way from being able to construct a legislative majority even with the assistance of its allies in the Kutla. As a result, Youssoufi began a long process of consultation with the other political parties - a process that did not exclude the MPDC. The new prime minister met with Khatib and the other leaders of the MPDC during February. Details of the discussions were not officially made public, but senior figures in the party let it be known that Youssoufi had indicated that he saw no serious obstacle to the MPDC participating in the new government and that furthermore, the party had been offered a post in the government.37 El Youssoufi's initiative obliged At-Tawhid and the MPDC to think through both their own attitude towards the new prime minister and the USFP as well as how far participation in the government would serve their interests. It was clear that the new prime minister commanded a significant degree of personal respect. Members of both organisations had been pleased by his positive statements about the MPDC in the run-up to the November election and by his invitation to talk about participation in the government. In an interview, Mustapha Ramid, now a member of parliament, remarked: 'The first secretary of the USFP has adopted a positive attitude in having affirmed that we are among his objective allies. He reiterated this when we had an audience with him after his appointment as prime minister.'38
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The prospect of having a voice in the government undoubtedly had a clear appeal to the Islamists of At-Tawhid. Benkirane in particular was very much in favour of joining the government. As he subsequently explained: 'I think it is a good thing to participate in government. It is good to have relations with other people and to be close to things and to gain experience and to help work for the future of the country'.39 His view was not, however, shared by the majority of the other members of his movement, who considered it still too early for involvement in the government. There were also other broader and more long-term considerations to be taken into account. The movement was very much aware of the fact that much of the MPDC's appeal in the elections had been its reputation and image as an opposition, and therefore anti-system, party, a party that the large numbers of Moroccans disillusioned with the existing political scene could feel confident voting for. By immediately accepting political office following its entry into parliament, the MPDC risked destroying its popular credibility and its electoral base. It was therefore for this reason that the party declined to participate in the new government. The party indicated that a single portfolio in the new government would not give it a sufficient enough say in policy-making to make its potential sacrifice of credibility worthwhile. Moreover, inclusion in the government would bind the party to other policies adopted by the government which they as party might not support. By remaining outside of the government, the party would be free to criticise and comment on government policy, the exact direction of which had remained still far from clear during the period that the new government was being put together.40 As well as the dangers and drawbacks of participation in the government, there was also an appreciation of the pitfalls of formal opposition to the new government. Although Ramid declared that 'we were and we remain an opposition party', he added and stressed that 'we look, above all, to practise a constructive form of opposition' .4I At-Tawhid and the MPDC were aware that the appointment of Youssoufi as prime minister represented the first time that a figure from the recognised political opposition had been appointed to head the government for nearly 40 years. To oppose this new development, or 'alternance' as it was termed, risked disassociation from what could emerge as a genuinely reforming and potentially popular government. In addition, the parties that now composed the official opposition in the aftermath of the election were those who had been involved in government more or less continuously for the past 40 years. If the MPDC was to become part of this formal opposition to the new government, it would be seen to be aligning itself with parties and personalities popularly associated with elitism and corruption and held responsible for many of Morocco's ills.
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The position the MPDC adopted to avoid the problems associated with both support and opposition to the new government was one that it termed 'critical support'. In essence, this entailed the party giving broad support to Youssoufi and his team while reserving the right to be critical on certain issues. In practice, inside parliament, the nine MPDC deputies demonstrated this approach by both formally backing the USFP's candidate for president of the chamber and voting in April 1998 to approve the new government's policy programme. At the same time as officially endorsing the government's overall programme, the party's deputies did not shy away from criticising parts of it. Ramid commented: 'The principle question on which we have expressed our reservations is that Islam as a reference has been excluded.' He complained that those references made to Islam were 'vague and elastic' and therefore fundamentally 'superficial'. More generally he observed that the programme appeared to merely continue many of the policies of previous administrations and therefore did not represent 'a true programme for change'.42 A similar judgement was made of the new government's first Finance Bill (Loi de Finances) which the MPDC deputies judged did not really seek to change anything and, again, was not essentially different from the previous government's programme.
The party retained its position of 'critical support' for the new government throughout and beyond the government's first year. It supported the government on most issues but at the same time could not avoid observing (alongside a growing section of public opinion) that little concrete was being done to tackle some of Morocco's more fundamental problems. A year after Youssoufi's nomination as prime minister, Abdelkrim Khatib was asked in a newspaper interview to make a judgement on the government's first year in office. He replied simply, 'Unfortunately, there is not a great deal to say.'43 Elsewhere, the party warned the government not to 'squander' the 'capital of confidence' it enjoyed as the first government of alternance and urged it to acknowledge its powerlessness and not try to claim that the promises contained in the election programmes could be immediately applied.44 The party was not afraid to challenge the government on individual issues it felt strongly about, particularly those with religious aspects. In 1999, as part of its attempts to help small and household businesses, the government proposed a new system of micro-credits which it hoped would help to create income generating schemes for those many Moroccans who had no formal access to credit. The Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (PJD, as the MPDC renamed itself from October 1998) strongly objected to this project on the grounds that it involved the charging of interest. In addition to the strictly religious objections to charging interest (riba), the PJD argued that by charging interest to some of Morocco's poorest people, the scheme was
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actually aggravating the situation of the needy. Not only did the party's deputies attempt to amend the proposed law in parliament, they also organised a petition against the law, neither of which measure succeeded in affecting the bill's passage through parliament. In a similar case, the party opposed the imposition of a tax on the Umra pilgrimage to Mecca. Elections were also a source of conflict between the PJD and parties in the governing coalition. Not only was there the running sore of the disputed seats officially credited to USFP candidates in November 1997 - an issue that remained unresolved by the courts in mid-1999 - but a series of by- elections were held in 1998-99 which saw MPDC/PJD candidates running against those from the government parties. Although both sides largely refrained from attacking each other on political or ideological grounds, mutual accusations of electoral malpractice were made. The by-election held in the Al Marinyine district of Fez in September 1998 led to some particularly bitter recriminations, especially from the MPDC. The party alleged in its newspaper that the government candidate (from the Istiqlal) in the election had used 'illegal, undemocratic means' in his campaign, notably making use of local commune vehicles and buildings to run his campaign in addition to issuing threats against both rival candidates and local voters.45 For its part, the Istiqlal renewed its accusation concerning the MPDC's 'shameless political exploitation of mosques for electoral ends'.46
However, in spite of these clashes over aspects of government policy and election campaigns, overall relations between the PJD and the government remained remarkably good. Both sides appeared keen to maintain cordial and even friendly relations and both made efforts and statements to this end. From the government's side, and in possible compensation for the decision to impose a tax on the Umra, the Finance Minister, Fathallah Oualalou, set aside funds for pilgrimage especially for Imams and Muezzins - a move that was interpreted as a direct gesture to the PJD. More informally, representatives from the PJD were invited to meetings the prime minister held for the parties composing the government. In the same way, representatives from all the governing parties attended a party organised in December 1998 by the PJD to mark its change of name from MPDC to PJD. Senior PJD and At-Tawhid figures continued to speak in complimentary terms about the prime minister as an individual and the USFP as a party. Relations with the other main Kutla party in the government, the Istiqlal, also remained good and the parties made common cause on issues such as the Umra tax. Benkirane, while claiming that the party had good relations with all other parties, acknowledged that ties with the Istiqlal were 'especially' close because of ideological common ground.47
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Relations with Other Islamists
One issue that attracted interest during the period of At-Tawhid's entry into political life was its relationship with the other Islamist groups and trends in Morocco. At-Tawhid represented just part of Morocco's wider Islamist 'movement', there being a number of other trends. Chief among these was the Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) movement. Al-Ihsan had origins fairly distinct from those that had produced At- Tawhid. It focused itself around the personality of Abdesalam Yassine, a charismatic thinker and preacher who had been active since the 1970s, and who, despite spells in prison for criticising the authorities and even the King, had attracted a substantial movement, particularly among students, around himself by the late 1980s. Sheikh Yassine's consistently critical approach towards Morocco's rulers ensured that he was kept under near continuous house arrest from the beginning of the 1990s until the year 2000.48 Al-Ihsan's hardline stance towards the Moroccan government came to stand in contrast with the much more accommodating line that Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid had begun to adopt in an attempt to achieve a rapprochement with the authorities. This contrast became increasingly obvious following At- Tajdid's stated intention to participate in the local and national elections of 1997. Al-Ihsan was critical of At-Tajdid''s attempts to gain access into the legal political field. Fathallah Arsalane, Al-Ihsan's chief spokesman while Yassine remained under house arrest, levelled that At-Tajdid had made 'concessions without getting anything in return'.49 For Al-Ihsan the elections were an empty diversion, lacking in any importance. Following the local elections of June 1997, Arsalane stated that the ballot had shown 'that old habits had not disappeared and that any change has not taken place'. Moreover, in reference to the forthcoming legislative elections, Arsalane judged that 'We estimate that these elections ... will signify nothing'.50 Al- Ihsan's refusal to even attempt to participate in the legal political arena represented, for its leaders, its status as Morocco's sole remaining movement of genuine opposition to the regime. Yassine's daughter, Nadia, who frequently spoke on her father's behalf, accused At-Tawhid of preferring 'to play the state's game' in putting 'their cards on the table', something her father's movement was as yet unprepared to do.51
At-Tawhid responded to the accusations from Al-Ihsan by acknowledging the difference of opinion but reiterating the value of political participation. Ahmed Raissouni, one of At-Tawhid's leading figures, when questioned in September 1997 on the state of relations between the two Islamist organisations, responded:
Our relations with Jamaat Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan are those of sympathy
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and brotherhood. Of course we have disagreements among which is the fact that our brothers in Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan do not see any use in elections.52
Significantly, two months later, following the elections to the House of Representatives, the response was more robust. Abdallah Benkirane stated that the 'brothers' in Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan now needed to reflect on developments and added: 'I think that the fact that nine of our candidates have been able to be elected, itself gives something to all the Islamist currents in Morocco to think about.'53 Benkirane's mild triumphalism indicated the degree to which political participation had become a significant issue among Morocco's Islamists. The debate did not solely revolve around issues of doctrine or indeed of simple strategy. At-Tawhid's participationist strategy and its initial successes had created tensions within Yassine's movement. Although those arguing that the movement should maintain its abstention from party politics triumphed over voices calling for Al-Ihsan to follow At-Tawhid's lead and involve themselves, this did not resolve the issue. Significant numbers of Al-Ihsan's supporters were reported to have joined At-Tawhid and the MPDC before, during and after the legislative elections. Benkirane's victory in a parliamentary by-election in Sale in April 1999 was seen as possibly putting further pressure on Al-Ihsan, with the PJD having registered an electoral success in Yassine's home town.54 In spite of apparent differences and rivalries between the two Islamist groupings, both maintained more solid and co-operative relations with each other at other levels. Representatives from both movements attended each other's meetings and the two movements regularly issued joint communiques on issues ranging from US foreign policy through to demands for the Arabisation of the education system. Moreover, At-Tawhid was vocal in its support of attempts to release Yassine from house arrest and sought to monitor the situation of imprisoned members of the Sheikh's organisation.55 PJD deputies in parliament asked questions of the Human Rights Minister concerning the status of Yassine and the MPDC/PJD newspapers carried statements both by leading figures in Al-Ihsan and by Islamist prisoners. Ahmed Raissouni attended conferences organised by Al- Ihsan that aimed to publicise Yassine's case and in May 1998 a delegation from the secretariat of the MPDC paid an official visit to the Sheikh. One area of growing tension between the two movements, however, was in the universities, where Islamism as a whole was particularly strong. Although the student branches of the two organisations issued joint communiques on issues such as police interventions on the campuses, relations became increasingly strained over what At-Tawhid's student wing (Talabat Al-Wahda wa At-Tmassoul - Unity and Responsibility) saw as Al-
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Ihsan's attempts to establish sole control over campus life and particularly the student union - the UNEM (Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains). Talabat Al-Wahda wa At-Tmassoul was very critical of Al-Ihsan's alleged falsification of election results in student elections and the movement's use of force and intimidation in preventing the holding of various seminars and exhibitions organised by other groups of students. The PJD national newspaper, At-Tajdid, compared these activities to those of a single party. Significantly, At-Tawhid and its student wing made common cause with the other non-Islamist parties to resist what was seen as an attempt by Al-Ihsan to establish a form of hegemony on the campuses. Relations between At-Tawhid and the smaller and more often clandestine sections of Morocco's diverse Islamist movement are more difficult to assess. Hostility and suspicion characterised the views of many of the other organisations to At-Tawhid. There was the recurrent accusation that Benkirane and his followers were in fact bankrolled by the government itself to spread a moderate and non-confrontational form of Islamism, thus undermining more radical groupings.56
Platform and Agenda
The entrance of Islamists into Morocco's recognised political forums, most importantly of all the House of Representatives, prompted inevitable attention towards the specific objectives of At-Tawhid and its allies. What did they wish to achieve? What were their stated aims? What were their views and proposed solutions for the many social, economic and political challenges Morocco faced at the end of the twentieth century. If political power was what was being sought, how would it be used once achieved? All of the above questions were asked of both At-Tawhid and the MPDC/PJD. The various precursor organisations of At-Tawhid had set out and explained their objectives and agenda since the early 1980s,57 but direct entry into electoral competition for political office renewed interest. The initial question of how far the agenda of the new MPDC would reflect that of its Islamist allies was answered when it became clear that the party's platform largely mirrored that of At-Tawhid. The first clear policy statement from the new alliance came in February 1997 on the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the MPDC. With the approach of elections at local and national levels, the statement amounted to a policy platform.58 The party issued a fuller statement on 1 November when it announced its intention to participate in the legislative elections and presented a formal electoral programme, the formal title of which was 'For a Total Revival. Authenticity - Justice - Development'.59 The importance of the three key words was stressed. Specifically, the
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programme focused on the importance of attachments to religious identity, historical authenticity and what was seen as the cultural specificity of Moroccan society. The party made it clear that no meaningful political or social reform could take place without reference to these central principles. The contents of the two programmes presented during 1997, together with the various other statements made by senior figures both through the party and in interviews, allowed the construction of a fairly comprehensive picture of what both the MPDC and At-Tawhid stood for and advocated in a number of key areas.
Democracy The fundamental question that continued to be posed both about and to the Islamists in At-Tawhid concerned their basic commitment to democracy. For many of the organisation's critics, At-Tawhid, like many other Islamist groupings, was simply making use of democratic mechanisms to gain access to political power. Once that political power was achieved, then the purely tactical espousal of democratic values would be abandoned. The desire of At-Tawhid's leaders to become involved in formal political processes had been stated explicitly since the 1980s. Their exclusion from these processes had led them to adopt a discourse that used much of the rhetoric of democracy calling on the Administration to respect political freedom and pluralism in an effort to secure their admittance. This rhetoric was largely retained even once admittance had been secured through the alliance with the MPDC and eventually through the securing of seats in parliament. The policy statement drawn up on the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the MPDC in 1997 included a commitment to the respect of political pluralism. During the November 1997 election campaign Ramid explained the MPDC's call for further constitutional reform in terms of wanting to 'strengthen the democratic option'. He went on to state: 'We defend the right to difference, to political ijtihad and to freedom of association for the parties, the unions and the associations.'60 However, it still remained unclear the extent to which the appeal for political pluralism was simply a device aimed at protecting At-Tawhid's own newly-secured place in the political scene. Ramid, for example, coupled his appeals for pluralism with talk about the need to 'struggle against all forms of exclusion of certain actors from national political life'.61 The reference to 'certain' rather than all political actors is telling. The leaders of At-Tawhid did indicate that certain political ideas (and therefore by implication those elements that supported them) were not acceptable. Pluralism had its limits. This approach was set out by Abdallah Benkirane in an interview when he argued: 'We have the right to choose that path that
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suits us, to make the choices we wish. But there are certain limits set by Islam and which our people accept. These limits must not be exceeded.'62 More specifically, Benkirane stated 'the one thing we do not accept is secularism'.63 If At-Tawhid's endorsement of pluralism was less than comprehensive, the organisation's commitment to democratic methods was more robust. At- Tawhid's leaders made it plain that they would seek to use only legal and constitutional methods to attain political power. They also went to great lengths to stress the movement's rejection of violence as a means of achieving objectives. Benkirane described At-Tawhid as 'a movement which totally rejects violence' and characterised himself as a 'convinced pacifist' justifying this by arguing that 'I sincerely believe that Islam does not permit this type of action'.64 The unambiguous language used to stress the movement's commitment to peaceful political methods reflected a particular concern on the part of the movement to distance itself from other Islamist groupings that were more ambivalent on the issue. At-Tawhid had itself originally emerged from Al- Shabiba Al-Islamiyya, an organisation that had been associated with the use of violence, most notably of all the murder of Omar Benjelloun, a prominent USFP activist, in 1975. The fact that Benkirane and many of the other future leaders of At-Tawhid were still members of Al-Shabiba when the assassination occurred was something that was not ignored by the press and opponents of the movement. When questioned on the issue, Benkirane and others acknowledged that Islamists had been implicated in the incident but emphasised that it had been the first and last example of the use of violence by Islamists.65 When challenged on the involvement of Islamist students in violent incidents which continued to occur on Morocco's university campuses, Benkirane argued that these incidents were not significant and were largely the work of leftist elements on the campuses.66
Social and Moral Issues The second set of issues that continued to be raised in relation to At-Tawhid and the MPDC concerned their attitudes towards what could be broadly termed social and moral issues. As with most other Islamist organisations, the achievement of political power was seen by At-Tawhid as simply a means to an end. The ultimate end was to use political power to realise the reconfiguration of society in order to make it more in line with the perceived principles of Islam. As an ultimate, overall objective, Benkirane stated: 'We want to see the Moroccan people and the Moroccan State following the texts of Islam.'67 Through policy documents and statements from senior figures the implications of the called for 'reinforcement of religion' in Morocco were
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elaborated. The implications for the position and role of women in society merited particular attention. The MPDC's programme for the November 1997 election promised to struggle 'against all forms of exploitation of the femininity of women and breaches of their dignity'.68 This was further elaborated by Mustapha Ramid who emphasised a commitment to help women resist 'all attempts to Westernise her and distance herself from her religious values'.69 The precise stance of At-Tawhid was defined in more concrete terms in relation to its attitude towards the Moudawana, or official personal status code, which set out the legal basis for the status of women in Moroccan society. Established after independence in 1958, the Moudawana had been criticised by Moroccan women's organisations for taking a highly conservative line on issues relating to women.™ At-Tajdid had strongly resisted the partially successful attempts made by women's organisations to reform the Moudawana in 1992-93 and continued to resist any further similar reform which it judged to be 'out of the question' and contrary to the precepts of Islam.71 As a defence to the inevitable charge that the movement was somehow 'anti-women', senior figures pointed out that the MPDC had put up three women candidates at the November 1997 election and that the party was 'not opposed to women teachers, doctors, pilots or even traffic police'.72The 1997 election programme advocated extending educational opportunities for women and argued that women should be allowed at least six months maternity leave from work.73 On the issue of the veil, although in favour of it, one of the movement's newspapers, At-Tajdid, claimed that it had hired an unveiled female staff member. The movement took a hard line stance on the issue of alcohol. In addition to acknowledgement of its negative social effects, its production, sale and consumption were judged to be in 'flagrant contradiction' with Islamic law.74 In a number of towns across Morocco, members of At-Tawhid who had been elected to commune councils resisted the introduction of new alcohol licences granted by the Ministry of Interior in the areas they represented. In several cases letters of protest and even peaceful sit-ins were organised to oppose the new licences. The movement on social issues as a whole adopted a generally moralistic tone. Benkirane, for example, while maintaining that he and the movement were in favour of tolerance, criticised what he saw as a tendency 'to confuse tolerance with permissiveness'.75 The movement's leaders criticised the showing of nude and sexual scenes on television and campaigned against the staging of a 'Miss Rabat' competition in the Moroccan capital in April 1999. The overarching solution to all of these issues was seen as the adoption of shari'a. The MPDC's election programme stated that: 'Constitutional articles related to Islam should be applied to make shari 'a the first source of
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all legislation and also to reject anything that contradicts shari'a\nHowever, Ramid was also anxious to add when discussing this subject that: 'It is necessary to stress, nevertheless, that we conceive the shari 'a as a pedagogic and ethical method ... and not as sanctions and punishments that the State would take against those who did not respect the provisions of shari'a.'11
Education Education was a stated area of priority for the movement. However, this prioritisation was not limited to the usual Islamist concerns over religious education and the extension of Arabisation. There was an acknowledgement of the urgent need to combat the very high levels of illiteracy in Morocco and to improve schooling for the poorer sections of society. The MPDC called for the establishment of special schools for the children of the poorest families and even advocated the opening up of the country's private schools to children from the middling and lower social classes.78 When questioned about the significant problems facing Morocco generally, Khatib replied: T estimate that the remedy is the education of the masses and of the young.'79 In its election programme of 1997, the MPDC was critical of the failure by the government to pursue a consolidated election policy mixing private, traditional and foreign forms of education altogether rather than introducing universally a 'public, unified, Arab, Moroccan education'.80 One potentially thorny educational issue that many Islamists often had difficulty in dealing with was that of the place of the Berber or Amazighi dialects. At-Tawhid and the MPDC/PJD approached the issue in a very conciliatory fashion, acknowledging that 'the mixture of cultures in Morocco is a fact' and that both Arabs and the Imazighen (plural of Amazigh) were Muslims.81 Many senior figures in At-Tawhid were of Berber origin and one of the MPDC's programmes called for the promotion of Arabic and the respect of Amazighi dialects.82 Although criticisms were voiced about elements that practised 'chauvinism',83 good relations were enjoyed with the mainstream of the Amazighi movement.84
The Economy The platform on the economy contained a similar mix of traditional religious concerns and calls for the improvement of the lot of Morocco's most disadvantaged people. The MPDC put a call for investment in social action at the forefront of its public agenda and was strongest in its support of the new government on initiatives launched by Youssoufi and his team to eradicate poverty. During the election campaign of 1997, the party committed itself to struggle against waste and corruption and continued to emphasise these themes once in parliament. It was critical of the holding of the Festival of Rabat in June 1998, claiming that the government money
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spent on the festival 'would have been better used employing hundreds of the unemployed and carrying out a number of development projects, particularly in the deprived areas which overflow with the marginalised'.85 The MPDC's 1997 election programme called for 'a balance of public interest and private interest'. It indicated that the state should play an important role in the economy but that it should be a case of 'state protection rather than state control' to guard against any exploitation of people. It also emphasised the need to pay more attention to the development of Morocco's poor rural areas.86 In a more specifically religious vein, the party claimed that the reintroduction of the Islamic zakat tax would help increase social solidarity and cohesion. On the subject of charging interest or riba, the party did not just campaign negatively against new laws (such as that on micro-credits) that incorporated interest, but also advocated the legalisation of banks that did not charge interest, claiming that there was significant public demand for such institutions. At the same time it was stressed that such proposed banks would not replace the existing interest-charging banks but would work alongside and compete with them.87
Justice Justice became an important theme for the movement and the party. This importance was reflected in the new name adopted by the party in October 1998 - Parti de la Justice et du Developpement. Similarly in 1999, when Benkirane was asked what the number one challenge facing Morocco was, he replied: 'Justice. Justice in the courts and justice in society.'88 Benkirane's specifying of two types of justice was interesting. The party's interest in social justice was evident in its expressed concern for Morocco's poorest elements, but its calls for reform of the country's judicial system were no less forthright. The party's election programme argued for greater independence for the courts 'from other powers', for greater Islamisation of the judicial system and against the practice of sending civilians before military courts.89 The concern with the issue of formal justice was undoubtedly related to the importance that many Islamists traditionally attached to legality and the rule of law. In the case of the Islamists of At-Tawhid, it was also the perceived injustices that Morocco's Islamists had suffered historically at the hands of the Moroccan judicial system that sharpened calls for reform. The party complained about arbitrary and political arrests and were critical of the harsh treatment Islamist offenders received when the perpetrators of offences against Islamists frequently went unpunished.90
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Foreign Affairs Stances adopted on international events and affairs were fairly typical of most Islamist movements. Solidarity and support for other Muslim - especially Islamic - states were stressed, as was a hostility towards Israel and a suspicion of the US.91 It was the combining of two of these elements in the US airstrikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in August 1998 and against Iraq the following December that led to the most vocal pronouncements on international affairs. The MPDC held meetings to express solidarity with the people of Sudan and Afghanistan in September 1998 at which support funds were collected and calls for a boycott of American-made products were made. In the wake of the American attacks against Iraq, Abdelkrim Khatib invited representatives of various political parties and associations (including Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsari) to his house to discuss a co-ordinated reaction.92 One international issue the party was consistently questioned on was the crisis in neighbouring Algeria. At-Tawhid was intensely aware that, as an Islamist organisation, official attitudes towards it were very much influenced by developments in Algeria where Islamism had played a large role.93 The movement's leaders therefore took care to condemn the excesses perpetrated by all sides in the conflict condemning both 'the terrorism of the State and the terrorism of the GIA'.94 They were critical of the references to jihad made by some of the armed groups, arguing that the practice of jihad had certain conditions and should be regulated by Islamic law which forbade the killing of women, children and the elderly.95 In the approach to the November 1997 legislative elections, At-Tawhid had considered issuing a communique condemning the activities of the GIA. However, despite many members feeling that it would be good to officially distance themselves from violence, it was decided that raising the issue at a potentially critical time would not necessarily be in the MPDC's best electoral interests.96 There was similar caution about links with other Islamist organisations and governments. Although the movement's newspapers carried regular sympathetic commentaries on other Islamists and printed interviews with figures such as Rachid Ghannoushi of the An-Nahda movement in Tunisia and the Iranian Ambassador to Morocco, comparisons with Morocco were always played down. At every opportunity, leaders of At-Tawhid were at pains to stress the specificity of the Moroccan case and therefore the specificity of the Moroccan Islamist movement. As Ramid replied, when questioned about lessons to be learned from the Islamist Refah party in Turkey (which had similarly been allowed to participate in electoral politics): 'We have our own school' and thus there was no need to 'try to copy' from other countries' experiences.97
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On other issues, predictable stances were taken. There was no deviation from the officially stipulated line that all Moroccan political parties should be supportive of Morocco's claim to the western Sahara. Indeed, the party went even further than was required. In addition to stating that the separatists of Polisario were acting against Islamic law, it pronounced itself against moves to hold a referendum in the territory despite the fact that the Moroccan government had publicly committed itself to such a solution.98 On the subject of the Euro-Mediterranean Accord that Morocco had signed with the European Union in 1995, Ar-Raya expressed suspicion about the aims of the agreement - suggesting that they sought primarily to secure markets for Europe. There was similar scepticism over the Accord's potential success given the huge economic differences between the north and south shores of the Mediterranean."
Structures and Organisation
From the date of Al-Islah wa At-TajdicTs, entry into the MPDC, both organisations underwent a significant and often bewildering number of structural, organisational and even titular changes. Not only did Al-Islah become At-Tawhid with the adherence of other smaller Islamist groupings, but also the MPDC formally renamed itself the PJD in October 1998. The second of these changes went some way to reducing some of the often confusing duality that had existed between At-Tawhid and the original MPDC - the two organisations having remained formally distinct despite the effective takeover of the latter by the former. The reason for the adoption of the new name for the political party was explained by various party figures in differing ways. Some claimed it was to distinguish the party from the plethora of other political parties that employed the terms Mouvement, Populaire, Democratique and Constitutionnel.100 As president of the party, Khatib explained the change in terms of a need to focus on the new issues of justice and development, the issues of democracy and constitutionalism being of less importance now than when the MPDC had been originally formed in 1967.l01 Ramid, however, was probably closer to the full truth when he stated that the changes in statutes and membership that had occurred to the MPDC since the entry of At-Tawhid in 1996 made a change of name inevitable.102 For most observers, the emergence of the PJD signified not just the death of the historic MPDC, but also the final achievement of one of the long-standing objectives of Morocco's Islamists: a political party of their own. Party leaders were quick to point out that the change of name implied no change in the party's objectives or principles and that it remained organisationally distinct from At-Tawhid. However, it was clear that the change of name reflected the reality that the two were in
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essence the same organisation and that the legal distinction was maintained only to provide a fallback if the PJD were to be one day banned. The de facto eclipse of the old MPDC had occurred arguably some time before its formal disappearance as a political party. The influx of members of At-Tawhid swamped the party's existing membership. The leaders of both organisations denied rumours that the integration of Islamists into the party had created tensions. They also sought to reduce the impression of a takeover by not only giving half the seats in the party's Politburo to the MPDC's existing members, but also by selecting a majority of existing MPDC members as candidates in the November 1997 elections. However, the fact that all nine candidates subsequently elected to parliament were members of At-Tawhid was a clear indication of where power really lay in the new partnership. The transition had not been without its difficulties. Not only had the MPDC's old guard attempted to forestall the march of At-Tawhid by allegedly persuading Khatib to boycott the local elections of June 1997, but Khatib himself appeared to have reservations about the new relationship. The founder and president of the MPDC acknowledged and accepted the new arrangement, but in interviews often could not hide his ideological differences with his new allies. He appeared particularly unhappy with the noticeably moralistic discourse of the Islamists. He did not, for example, share their hostility to attempts to reform the Moudawana, stating that he, personally, was in favour of reform of the code.103 On the issue of education - and in what appeared to be a conscious defiance of the Islamists - Khatib argued that the imperative of education meant that it was important 'to create more schools than mosques'.1** Even on the subject of the role of shari'a, held sacrosanct by the Islamists, Khatib argued that before applying shari'a it was 'necessary to build a Muslim society based on legality, solidarity, a job for all'. He added, possibly pointedly, 'Those who want today to apply shari'a in all its rigour are in error' because it was necessary to 'go back to the sources' to understand the issues.105 However, Khatib remained the only member of the old MPDC with a public profile and bouts of personal ill health from the end of 1998 served to further curtail his influence.106
The dominance of At-Tawhid and its membership in the MPDC/PJD indicated that the structure of the Islamist association was itself worth examining. The long evolution of At-Tawhid from its origins in the 1980s meant that it had developed a fairly established structure and organisation. Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid had by the early 1990s set up its own student branch in the universities, organised campaigns on social and health issues and participated in marches and cultural events. At its head the association developed a form of collective leadership with official leaders rotating every few years.107 This reflected Mohamed Tozy's view that the movement
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was more 'a collection of personalities' than one built around a single charismatic figure, as was the case with Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan and Abdesalam Yassine.108 The association also prided itself on the fact that the rotation of leaders was decided by democratic ballot every four years. It was also pleased to point out that such democratic practices had been brought into the MPDC as well, the party's change of name occurring after a ballot where members could choose from a list of alternative names. There were also plans to organise elections in the local branches of the party. Despite its established structures, At-Tawhid also acknowledged the need to change and develop its structures. In a move that had been trailed for over a year before, the movement's official leader, Ahmed Raissouni, declared in October 1998:
Our movement is currently undergoing a phase of transition ... a phase of discussion and dialogue among its members ... a phase of building institutions. These institutions will replace the traditional individualistic leadership and institutions. We do not only need good people working for the movement, but we also need good institutions.109
He added that these institutions would be 'renewed and changed from time to time and elected to avoid any kind of corruption, networking or stagnation'.110 The exact size of the membership of At-Tawhid and the MPDC/PJD was not officially made known, but Benkirane estimated it as being somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 members with the membership of At-Tawhid being probably twice as large.111 The readership of the various newspapers issued by both At-Tawhid and the political party was usually estimated at between 15,000 and 35,000."2 One area where the movement and the political party expanded their activities and organisation was at the local level. Following their election in November 1997, most of the new MPDC deputies opened offices in the constituencies that had elected them. Open six days a week, these offices not only received the problems and complaints of local residents, but also provided legal advice through qualified staff. Some deputies also created local associations in their districts, which focused on issues of health, education, environment and sport. Although officially and legally apolitical, these local associations were closely linked with At-Tawhid and helped consolidate support for the local member of parliament. They also helped further build the party's popular image of being close to ordinary people."3
The Makhzen
Over and above issues of policy, structure, names and even elections, the key issue in understanding the political demarche of At-Tawhid has been its
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relationship with those holding political power in the Moroccan state: the makhzen. The entirety of the movement's progress from clandestine action in the 1980s through to its participation in the legal political arena needs to be understood not primarily in terms of the movement's own desire for participation, but rather in the context of the makhzen deciding to allow it a place in political processes. Two questions need to be addressed in this regard: first, what did the movement do to persuade those in power that it could be safely allowed into the system, and secondly, what other reasons did the makhzen have for allowing this entry? In answer to the first question, the leaders of At-Tawhid and its forerunning organisations primarily succeeded in convincing the authorities that they presented no immediate challenge to the existing political order. As discussed earlier, great pains were taken during the 1980s in particular to demonstrate that the movement rejected violence and fully supported the core institution of the makhzen: the monarchy itself. Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid had already affirmed that the existence of a monarchy based on descent from the Prophet Mohammed meant that the Islamist demand for the establishment of an Islamic state, prominent among Islamists elsewhere, was redundant in the Moroccan context."4 On the issue of radical ideology and violence, Benkirane confirmed that the party had undertaken to avoid 'all drift in the discourse so as not to reproduce what has happened in Egypt and Algeria'.115 The movement also made sure that it maintained a peaceful and law-abiding image in terms of its behaviour. Protests organised by the party (such as those against new alcohol licences) scrupulously avoided any threat to public order and if official sanction was not given to a march or public activity (as in the case of the protests against the bombing of Iraq in December 1998) the movement invariably withdrew its public support for the event. The MPDC deputies' sober and measured behaviour in parliament was another aspect of this approach and undoubtedly lay behind the tacit approval that was given by the authorities to the party's wish to transform itself into the PJD. The reasons behind the makhzen's allowance of the entry of Islamists into the legal political field were several-fold. The main reason was that it represented part of a strategy to head off any serious potential challenge to the Moroccan State by Islamists. The authorities in Morocco were only too aware of the fateful turn of events in neighbouring Algeria and were intent on preventing anything similar occurring in Morocco. It was judged that the mistake made by Algeria's rulers had been to open the political system fully to the country's Islamists in 1989 and then to try to shut the movement and the whole political process down only three years later. While the option of total repression and closure had an obvious appeal and had been implemented in Tunisia, the Moroccan authorities considered that this
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policy might serve dangerously to bottle-up and radicalise its own Islamist movement. Some limited and carefully controlled opening to Islamism would therefore forge a middle way between the extremes of repression and full openness and hopefully relieve any subversive pressures that might be building-up. The autumn of 1995 saw the makhzen launch an attempted rapprochement with the country's largest Islamist organisation Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan through releasing Yassine from house arrest. However, Yassine's refusal to co-operate with official wishes prompted the authorities to turn to the country's second largest movement: Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid. Already officially tolerated if not legally recognised for the purposes of avoiding radicalisation, At-Tajdid, having failed in its attempts to have a political party recognised in 1992, was given a 'green light' from the authorities for its plans to merge with Khatib's MPDC. Publicly, the green light came in the form of comments made by King Hassan II in an interview on German television. Of Morocco's Islamists he remarked: 'As long as they do not demonstrate a schism or a heresy and they conform to the laws of the state, I will not intervene.'"6
It was hoped that the presence of Islamists both on the ballot paper and in parliament would reconcile some of the more radical elements in society to formal political processes. Benkirane referred to this factor following the November 1997 elections when he observed that the MPDC's participation in the election had, by attracting the support of the unemployed youth, helped reduce a destabilising factor in the country."7 More specifically, through this opening to the Islamists of At-Tawhid, the authorities also hoped to undermine support for and foster dissent within Al-Adl wa Al- Ihsan. As an organisation, Al-Ihsan had proved unwilling to fully co-operate with the makhzen and through its more radical agenda presented more of a threat to the existing political order. There was also possibly an external dimension to the decision to allow political space to Islamism. In an interview with the French newspaper Liberation in June 1998, Prime Minister Youssoufi, when asked about Islamism, replied: 'When we were in the opposition, we were already saying that the situation was such that it could open the way to a more extreme and more radical opposition. Now in power, we are condemned to succeed. For if we fail, we will open the way to an opposition of another sort. We must avoid this development for our country.'"8 This statement to a foreign newspaper was taken as an attempt by Youssoufi to shore up support abroad for himself and his government by raising the spectre of Islamism. The interview coincided with plans for a proposed official visit to France where Youssoufi would be seeking French help with the management of Morocco's large international debt. Paris, deeply aware of the Algerian crisis and fearful of Islamism, would undoubtedly be
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responsive to any appeal for help from Morocco to stave off the perceived advance of its Islamists. Although most of the Moroccan press concluded that the prime minister had been primarily referring to Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan, the recent arrival of the Islamists of At-Tawhid in parliament may have provided implicit support to Youssoufi's warning. The entry of At-Tawhid onto the political scene did not, of course, mean that it would be given complete freedom once there. The movement and the party continued to be monitored by the authorities and the political space it had been afforded was inevitably restricted. Both At-Tawhid and the MPDC chaffed publicly at the perceived official restrictions placed on them during the November 1997 election campaign. However, once they witnessed that they had been allowed a small, but significant, place in parliament, attitudes towards the authorities warmed considerably and a form of modus vivendi developed. Benkirane spoke at a post-election press conference held at the ultimate symbol of the makhzen - the ministry of the interior. Good relations were also fostered between the movement and the ministry of habous and religious affairs which invited members of At-Tawhid to the officially sponsored religious conference As-Sahwa Al-Islamiyya in November 1998."9 Leaders of At-Tawhid spoke well of the long-time minister of habous and religious affairs, Abdelkebir Mdaghri Alaoui, who in return commented that he was 'very satisfied with the dialogue that has been in place up until now' with the Islamists.120 The apparent warmth of relations between At-Tawhid and the authorities inevitably led to a renewal of the charge that the association was to some degree under the control of - or even in the pay of - the makhzen. Traditionally, such charges had come from the more radical fringes of the Islamist movement, but now they were increasingly heard from another source. In the by-election held in Sale in April 1999, the candidate from the USFP accused the PJD's candidate, Benkirane, of being the candidate of the Administration.121 On initial reading the accusation seemed strange given that the USFP was the dominant party in the government. However, the charge was revealing of the important and controversial duality that existed at the heart of the Moroccan administration following the appointment of Youssoufi's government of alternance. The new government was forced to cohabit with substantial parts of the traditional makhzen, not least in the government itself where four senior ministers were appointed by the Palace directly and thus did not represent parties forming the majority in parliament. It did not go unnoticed that two of these four ministers were those of the interior and of habous and religious affairs - both of which appeared to enjoy good relations with At-Tawhid. Suspicions about links between the makhzen and the Islamists went even further in suggesting that one of the main reasons why they had been allowed to participate in the
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elections was to undermine support for and take votes away from the USFP and the other opposition parties. Also, once in parliament, the MPDC deputies represented a potentially popular and critical opposition to the new government. Despite the advent of alternance, many in the former opposition parties in the Kutla parties remained suspicious of the makhzen, believing that it still sought to control and possibly thwart the efforts of the new government. At-Tawhid and the MPDC/PJD were inevitably anxious to rebut these accusations. At the by-election in Sale, Benkirane stressed that he represented only his party and highlighted the apparent contradiction of the accusation against him, stating later: 'We ran our campaign alone with no- one's help except God's. Not Mr Yassine. Not Mr Ministry of Interior. No- one."22 More generally, when faced with the recurrent accusation of being in the pay of the authorities, particularly the ministry of interior, Benkirane repeatedly recalled his militant past as a member of Al-Shabiba Al- Islamiyya, his arrests and his spells in prison in the 1980s where he had been tortured.'" He attested that he and his party had only met with the minister of interior once in 1997 during the run-up to the legislative elections to explain the party's position on various issues.124
Conclusion
The whole experience of At-Tawhid's entrance into legal politics provides an interesting case study of not only how regimes seek to deal with the issue of Islamism by affording room to co-operative elements of the movement, but also how these elements themselves cope with the experience. A common observation is either that the regime is manipulating the Islamists to serve their own ends or, alternatively, that it is the Islamists who are taking advantage of the regime to gain a toe-hold in political power structures as a prelude to a more concerted and possibly forceful assault on power. The truth is inevitably somewhere between these two rival explanations. Both those in power and the Islamists often have a mutual interest in co-operation and cohabitation. This is certainly true in the case of Morocco. The Moroccan makhzen has a number of reasons, as already explained, for providing an opening to At-Tawhid and the PJD. For the latter, the objectives are less clear and perhaps more long term. At-Tawhid has made no secret of the fact that a place in the legal political sphere gives it a platform for its views and the theoretical possibility of influencing decision- making. However, it has sought to downplay any suggestion that it has any grand future strategy to gain political power. Its experience through the long years of the 1980s and 1990s has taught it that any freedom or status it
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enjoys, including its current public position, has been at the sufferance of the political powers in Morocco, a sufferance that could be ended at any time. There is an awareness that should the movement be seen to be stepping out of the carefully defined space that has been allowed to it, then this could spell the end of its foray into legal politics. Any talk of substantial electoral advances for the party at the next set of legislative elections is both discouraged and probably misplaced. The PJD is aware of the fact that it was when the FIS in Algeria won large numbers of seats in the ill-fated legislative elections of 1991 that the Algerian regime moved against the party. Benkirane referred obliquely to this subject when talking about the scale of the MPDC's participation in the run-up to the 1997 legislative elections in Morocco: 'Our participation in the legislative elections will be limited, not for fear of winning an absolute majority, but because we are convinced that we represent only a part of national political life' (italics added).125 It would appear that rather than risk the wrath of the authorities by mounting an early challenge for the control of the state, the PJD will play a longer game, waiting to see how events unfold. It is conscious that inevitable changes at the very apex of the Moroccan state are likely to lead to changes further down the system. It is unlikely, though, that even in this event will the PJD depart from its current cautious and gradualist course. Critics of the party are wont to see this course as being purely a strategic choice, an alternative to the preferred but more unrealistic path of radicalism. However, the length of time that this path of moderation has been held progressively indicates that the movement's commitment to gradualism and constitutionalism is in fact genuine.
For the moment At-Tawhid and the PJD are content to exploit the favourable strategic position they find themselves in. By adopting a position of 'critical support' towards the Youssoufi government they appear supportive of what is a generally popular political initiative. At the same time they are sufficiently distanced from the government to be free from implication in its shortcomings and will stand to benefit from any loss of support the government suffers. Indeed, the increasingly perceptible disillusionment that accompanied the Youssoufi government's first year in office was attributed by some newspapers as being behind Benkirane's defeat of the USFP candidate in Sale in April 1999.'26 The seemingly fortuitous positioning of the PJD on the political scene does, however, carry some strategic risks. By appearing too close to the system and too moderate in their criticism of it, At-Tawhid and the PJD risk being outflanked by more radical elements, particularly Abdesalam Yassine's Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan. The rival Islamist movement is fond of stating that it represents the only real opposition in Morocco.127 The PJD has responded by stating that 'we are the opposition of His Majesty, not the
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opposition to His Majesty'.128 It remains to be seen what difference this distinction will make.
NOTES
1. Fatiha Layadi and Narjis Rerhaye, Maroc: Chronique d'une democratic devenir (Casablanca: Editions EDDIF 1998) p.176. 2. Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa (Boulder: Westview 1997) pp.190-91. 3. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p.182. 4. It was also claimed that Khatib had on one occasion - in 1965 - been approached by the King to become prime minister, but had put too many conditions on his appointment for the Palace to accept it. John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson 1970) p.250. 5. Interview with Mustapha Ramid, member of the executive of At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah, in La Nouvelle Tribune, 2 Oct. 1997. 6. Liberation (Paris), 5 June 1996. 7. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p.186. 8. Liberation (note 6). 9. Rabitat Al-Mustaqbal was itself the product of an earlier fusion between two smaller Islamist organisations, Al-Jamiyya Ad-Da'awa Al-lslamiyya based in Fes and Al-Jamiyya Al-lslamiyya in Ksar El Kebir. Both groupings dated back to 1976 and primarily consisted of teachers. 10. A national referendum had been held in September 1996 to approve the proposed changes to the Constitution, but the MPDC and At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah had officially boycotted the ballot. 11. Mohamed Tozy suggests that Khatib interpreted the MPDC's exclusion from the National Commission as a sign of Royal repudiation: Tozy, Monarchie et Islam Politique au Maroc (Paris: Presses de Sciences PO 1999) p.253. 12. Ibid, p.239. 13. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p.183. 14. Interview with Mustapha Ramid in Le Quotidien du Maroc magazine, 14 Nov. 1997. 15. La Nouvelle Tribune, 6 Nov. 1997. 16. The party also complained that the administration deliberately delayed the disbursement of this aid, thus preventing the party from making full use of it during the campaign. 17. Interview with Mustapha Ramid in La Nouvelle Tribune, 2 Oct. 1997. 18. Le Quotidien du Maroc, 12 Nov. 1997. 19. Ramid (note 14). 20. La Gazette du Maroc, 26 Nov. 1997. 21. Le Monde, 14 Nov. 1997. 22. One of the party's victorious candidates, Idrissi Abouzid, was subsequently to publicly claim: 'The MPDC would have been able to have 45 deputies if the elections were fair.' Le Quotidien du Maroc, 24 June 1998. 23. La Gazette du Maroc, 26 Nov. 1997. 24. The minimum number of deputies required to constitute a group in the Moroccan House of Representatives is 12. This perhaps explains why the MPDC chose to protest specifically three seats it believed it had been unfairly defeated in at the election. Recognition of victory in these three seats, together with the existing nine seats, would give the party 12 seats which would then entitle it to office space and access to other similar facilities in parliament. 25. Le Quotidien du Maroc, 8 Sept. 1997. 26. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p.181. 27. Ramid (note 14).
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28. Ibid. Ramid did not actually mention the MDS by name, but instead referred to the colour the party had been allocated for the campaign. 29. Liberation (Rabat), 19 Nov. 1997. 30. See La Gazette du Maroc, 3 Dec. 1997; La Nouvelle Tribune, 13 Nov. 1997. 31. La Nouvelle Tribune, 13 Nov. 1997. 32. La Gazette du Maroc, 26 Nov. 1997. 33. Despite the apparent magnanimity of this gesture, members of the MPDC remained critical. It was alleged that the 'victorious' USFP candidate, Mohammed Hafid, had already arranged a victory celebration after the result - an event that was only called off when the extent of public reaction to the result became known: ibid. 34. Liberation (note 29). 35. Interview with Abderrahmane El Youssoufi in Jeune Afrique, 11 Nov. 1997. 36. Interview with Abderrahmane El Youssoufi in Le Quotidien du Maroc, 14 Nov. 1997. 37. La Gazette du Maroc, 4 March 1998; interview with Ramid in La Gazette du Maroc, 25 March 1998. 38. Ramid, ibid. 39. Author's interview with Abdallah Benkirane, Rabat, 25 June 1999. 40. Ramid (note 37). 41. Ibid. 42. Le Reporter, 21 April 1998. 43. Interview with Abdelkrim Khatib in Le Reporter, 16 Feb. 1999. 44. La Gazette du Maroc, 7 April 1999. 45. Ar-Raya, 9 Sept. 1998. 46. L'Etendard, 18 Sept. 1998. 47. Benkirane (note 39). 48. For more details on the origins, history and ideology of Abdesalam Yassine and Al-Adl wa Al-lhsan see Shahin (note 2) pp. 193-5; and Henry Munson, Religion and Power in Morocco (New Haven: Yale University Press 1993) pp.162-73. 49. Liberation (Paris), 20 Dec. 1995. 50. Le Quotidien du Maroc, 8 Sept. 1997. 51. Interview with Nadia Yassine in Le Journal, 26 Oct. 1998. These comments were made with specific reference to the PJD's willingness to talk about the size of its membership. 52. Interview with Ahmed Raissouni in La Gazette du Maroc, 1 Oct. 1997. 53. La Gazette du Maroc, 10 Dec. 1997. 54. Doubt was cast on the significance of this result given that only 18 per cent of the registered voters voted on the day of the election. It was unclear whether this signified a tactic of abstention by Yassine's movement or, as Benkirane claimed, was the result of polling stations closing early and the poll taking place on a working day: see interview with Benkirane in La Gazette du Maroc, 5 May 1999. Nevertheless, Benkirane was said to have made a number of visits to Yassine before announcing his participation in the election. For his part, Benkirane claimed that he and the PJD won the election without help from Yassine and Al-Adl wa Al-lhsan: author's interview with Benkirane, Rabat, 6 July 1999. 55. In June 1998, for example, the secretary general of the MPDC met with a delegation from Amnesty International to discuss the issue of Islamist prisoners, particularly those belonging to Al-Adl wa Al-lhsan. 56. Munson (note 48) p.161. 57. For details of these see Shahin (note 2) pp. 189-92. 58. The statement contained nine basic points espousing; an attachment to Islamic principles; support for the defence of the constitutional monarchy; respect for political pluralism; the participation of Moroccan women in society in order to edify it; the need to struggle against illiteracy; a call for a revision of school curricula; the giving of greater importance to the rural world in the social and economic policies of the state; the promotion of Arabic and respect for Tamazigh the Berber dialects; and a declaration of a will to help in the amelioration of problems suffered by the youth, especially unemployment. Le Quotidien du Maroc, 16 June 1998. 59. Al-Bamamaj Al-Intikhabi. Al-Haraka Ash-Sha'biyya Ad-Dusturiyya Ad-Dimukrattiyya.
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Al-lntikhabat An-Niyabiyya 1418 Hijra - 1997. (Election Programme, MPDC, Parliamentary Elections 1997). 60. Ramid (note 14). 61. Ibid. 62. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p. 184. 63. Ibid. 64. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) pp.180 and 175. 65. In spite of this admission, Benkirane pointed out that Abdelkrim Mouti, the leader of Al- Shabiba Al-Islamiyya, had always denied personal involvement in the incident; Ibid. p.175. 66. Ibid. pp. 180-81. On the issue of violence, Tozy observes that this topic had been the subject of lengthy debate among the former members of Al-Shabiba who eventually formed Al-Islah wa At-Tajdid, indicating that the decision to reject violence was not one that had been adopted for short-term strategic considerations: Tozy (note 11) p.246. 67. Author's interview with Abdallah Benkirane, Rabat, 6 July 1999. 68. La Nouvelle Tribune, 6 Nov. 1997. 69. Ramid (note 14). 70. Among other things, the Moudawana stipulated that a woman could not enter into a marriage contract on her own; was treated by the law as a minor until her marriage (regardless of her age); and had only certain protections against her husband taking additional wives. For further details see Laurie A. Brand, Women, the State and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences (New York: Columbia University Press 1998) pp.57-62. 71. La Gazette du Maroc, 11 March 1998. 72. Ibid. 1 April 1998. 73. Al-Barnamaj Al-Intikhabi (note 59). 74. Ramid (note 14). 75. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p.184. 76. Al-Barnamaj Al-Intikhabi (note 59). 77. Ramid (note 14) 78. La Gazette du Maroc, 11 March 1998 and 9 Dec. 1998. 79. Khatib (note 43). 80. Al-Barnamaj Al-lntikhabi (note 59). 81. Interview with Moqri Abou Yazid, PJD member of parliament, in La Nouvelle Tribune, 10 Dec. 1998. 82. See Le Quotidien du Maroc, 16 June 1998. 83. Khatib (note 43). 84. This was in contrast to relations between the Amazighi movement and Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan after Abdesalam Yassine had characterised the movement as divisive. 85. La Gazette du Maroc, 17 June 1998. 86. Al-Barnamaj Al-Intikhabi (note 59). 87. Yazid (note 81). A more orthodox line seemed to be taken by Ramid, who stated on the issue of riba about the necessity of 'the revision of economic, financial and banking legislation in terms of it conforming with the text of the Qur'an': Ramid (note 14). 88. Benkirane (note 39). 89. Al-Barnamaj Al-lntikhabi (note 59). 90. Ar-Raya, 21 Oct. 1998. 91. The party was, for example, against any move to normalise relations with Israel and regarded the US as being behind numerous wars and was described as having an 'oppressive soul': La Gazette du Maroc, 25 Nov. 1998; Ar-Raya, 26 Aug. 1998 and 9 Sept. 1998. 92. The PJD did not officially participate in an organised demonstration against the US attacks on 20 December. Despite being involved in planning the protest, the party agreed to respect the decision to postpone the protest by the committee established by the various parties to co-ordinate action. Significantly, the PJD's official absence from the unsanctioned demonstration that went ahead led to it being dominated by militants from Al-Adl wa Al- Ihsan.
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93. The official rejection of Al-Islah waAt-Tajdid's application to form a political party in 1992 was undoubtedly connected to events that were occurring in Algeria that same year. There the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) had come close to winning legislative elections before being dissolved by the authorities leading to mounting tension and uncertainty that spread beyond Algeria's borders. Abdallah Benkirane accepts this was a factor, but believes that other issues also played a part: Benkirane (note 67). 94. La Gazette du Maroc, 28 Jan. 1998. 95. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p.185. 96. La Gazette du Maroc, 22 Oct. 1997. In spite of the MPDC's caution, one foreign journalist noted the applause that greeted the mention of the name of Abassi Madani, the leader of the FIS, at one of the party's election rallies: Le Monde, 14 Nov. 1997. 97. Ramid (note 37). 98. La Gazette du Maroc, 25 Nov. 1998 and 17 Feb. 1999. 99. Ar-Raya, 9 Sept. 1998. 100. Le Quotidien du Maroc, 6 Oct. 1998. 101. Khatib (note 43). 102. Interview with Ramid in La Gazette du Maroc, 1 Oct. 1998. 103. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p.187. 104. Khatib (note 43). 105. Layadi and Rerhaye (note 1) p.187. 106. In December 1998 Khatib had even expressed his wish to stand down from the presidency of the party because of his failing health. Significantly, the leaders of At-Tawhid had dismissed such a suggestion, possibly out of a wish to retain Khatib as an important figurehead and to rebut accusations of complete domination by At-Tawhid: La Nouvelle Tribune, 10 Dec. 1998. 107. Shahin(note2)p.l91. 108. Tozy (note 11) pp.227-8. 109. Ar-Raya, 21 Oct. 1998. 110. Ibid. 111. Benkirane (note 67). Le Journal, 26 Oct. 1998 quoted the PJD as claiming a figure of between 15,000 and 20,000. 112. These newspapers included Ar-Raya and Al-Asr which came in time to be replaced by At- Tajdid and Ifriqia: La Gazette du Maroc, 10 Feb. 1999 and 24 Feb. 1999. 113. Le Reporter 22 Sept. 1998. One deputy, Rachid M'Douar, who represented Casablanca Bab Jdid, was reported to have distributed 1,250 school bags to local children, paid for out of his own salary. 114. In 1994, Mohamed Yatim of Al-Islah had written: 'Our problem is not in establishing an Islamic state. Theoretically and constitutionally, this state already exists. We on the contrary support this legitimacy and consider it an asset that should not be given up or disputed.' Shahin (note 2) pp.190-91. 115. La Gazette du Maroc, 19 Nov. 1997. 116. Liberation (Paris), 5 June 1996. 117. La Gazette du Maroc, 19 Nov. 1997. 118. Interview with Abderrahmane El Youssoufi in Liberation (Paris), 24 June 1998. 119. Significantly, members of Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan also received official invitations to the conference. 120. Interview with Abdelkebir Mdaghri Alaoui in Maroc Hebdo International, 17 Oct. 1998. 121. Le Journal, 1 May 1999. 122. Benkirane (note 67). 123. Maroc Hebdo International, 7 May 1999. 124. Benkirane (note 67). 125. Le Quotidien du Maroc, 8 Sept. 1997. 126. Maroc Hebdo International, 7 May 1999. 127. Nadia Yassine (note 51). 128. Khatib (note 43).
Source : The Journal of North African Studies
