Algeria and the impact of the new geopolitical configuration of the Maghreb in the Western Sahara conflict
Regional integration of the Maghreb is essential to the U.S. strategy of “trading blocs” behind globalization is still not a reality despite many partnerships United States/North Africa or Europe / North Africa set up for this purpose. At the root of these failures, permanent differences between countries of the region for economic but also political choices.
Will changes in recent months following the Arab revolt, lead to a new geopolitical configuration that can remove the conflict of Western Sahara’s characteristic of any major obstacle to intra-regional cooperation?
The Arab Revolt in North Africa has already overthrown the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes. Libya has lived rather an armed uprising. This one has turned into a civil war, with the participation of foreign forces from The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This war will finally overthrow the Gaddafi regime. The common feature of these regimes was their longevity strategy that left little hope for a possible democratic change (1).
Countries such as Morocco and Algeria have experienced problems relating to the revolutionary wave, but no real serious so far.
Knowing that the Libyan regime of Colonel Gaddafi was an informal supporter of the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara conflict, one should expect to see the position of the new libyan regime consistent with that of France and the United States, his supporters in his quest for power.
The Western Sahara conflict is being negotiated since the entry into force of the cease-fire in 1991.
The United States and the European Union are working on making the region an integrated entity since the end of the Cold War, in order to foster better cooperation between the Maghreb and the West in the economic, the military and the security fields. This requires an effective intra-regional cooperation.
Algeria, the Polisario Front support
With approximately 35.6 million inhabitants and an area of 2381 741 km2, the Democratic People’s Republic of Algeria (RADP) is a former French colony, that became independent in July 5, 1962. Located in North Africa as part of the Maghreb, it has as neighbors, Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. It also has a coast on the Mediterranean Sea.
Since its independence acquired after a long struggle against the French colonial power, Algeria has made people self-determination a principle dear. Thus it has supported more or less directly many movements struggle for independence.
This reason that Algeria has often advanced to justify his support for the Polisario Front, at the start of its armed conflict against Morocco in the mid-1970s. Alger also justified his interest in this conflict by the fact that it taking it at it border and therefore requires vigilance.
Algerian support at the beginning of this conflict took the form of a contribution in weapons, logistics, military troops, diplomacy and finance. After the cease-fire in 1991, military aid was reduced, but financial and diplomatic components was strengthened.
Of the four options on the table to resolve this conflict (2), Algeria’s support goes to the organization of a referendum on self-determination of the Saharawi people under the auspices of the United Nations.
Algeria has welcomed Sahrawi refugees on its territory of Tindouf, where it has long erected refugee camps. Indeed, the territory of Western Sahara is divided by a wall of 1500 km erected by Morocco, but many chose to flee the Saharawi territory to reach the refugee camps of Tindouf.
Thus, following the gradual reduction of international assistance in support of the Polisario, Algeria today extends its aid to food, fiscal or monetary. At the international level, the support of Algeria to SADR (3) is characterized by a significant investment in the diplomatic field in order to meet the Moroccan efforts at the same level.
Indeed, to date, the Sharifi kingdom was able to convince countries like the United States, France and Spain that, an independent Sahara (4) will threaten the stability of the kingdom by the fact that Algeria would benefit to besiege Morocco in its southern border, then causing moroccan reaction, concentration of moroccan forces along the border with all the risks of a triggering armed conflict at any time between the two forces (5). Some experts believe that an independent Sahrawi state will need, at least in its early years, a country protection for its security, and this country could be Algeria.
The new position in the Libyan Sahara conflict
The impact of the new configuration on the North African on the Western Sahara conflict could be in the form of three against one (6).
The return on the international stage of Libya had been conditioned by many changes that the Libyan regime had to achieve. Gaddafi had finally resolved to comply with the requirements of the “international community”. The concessions that Gaddafi’s regime has made: Agree to deliver the Libyans accused of being responsible for terrorist acts on American flight over Lockerbie in 1988 and French flight in Niger in 1989. Agree to indemnify the victims’ families. Agree to abandon the program of development and production of weapons of mass destruction under international supervision.
The issue on which this regime was still failing on their eyes was: the establishment of democracy, respect for human rights and its corollaries.
The position of Gaddafi’s Libya has often been that of supporting the Polisario Front in its struggle for self-determination. It is true that in 2006 Libya gave the impression, probably by strategy, to support the position of a Moroccan Sahara. However, by 2009, Libya would become officially neutral on this issue.
The action (albeit not truly verified) for Polisario, to send mercenaries to the Libyan regime in its war against the Libyan National Transition Council, without being a determining factor, could influence the decision of the new government of Libya to support the Moroccan position of autonomy in the Sahara. In reality one should expect that the new Libya aligns it position behind this of NATO members, that is to say supports the Moroccan option of autonomy.
In addition, it will initiate political reforms along the lines of the introduction of democracy, of respect of human rights and its corollaries. It will remain an important partner for the United States and the European Union within the framework of the fight against the terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the Sahel, like Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Algeria.
The challenge of an integrated Maghreb on the Western Sahara conflict.
For Americans who prefer a peaceful resolution of this conflict, its instability has created an environment conducive to terrorism. It’s therefore necessary to solve it for the stability, the security and the prosperity of the region. Indeed, for the United States and the European Union, cooperation between the countries is essential for several reasons. The most important of these reasons being of course the fight against terrorism. The Maghreb is indeed the gateway to Europe and many surveys have shown that terrorist groups operating in Europe also recruit in the Maghreb and European suburbs, heavily populated by North African natives.
Economic trade of policy of globalization require an integration of the region and a stable and secure environment. Thus, the desire for Europe and the United States to practice the trade and invest on a larger scale in the region will not find satisfaction as mistrust continue to create barriers among the member countries. Their policies do not allow a smooth flow of goods and people.
For most of the players, regional as outside, the Saharian conflict is considered the main obstacle to the establishment of a Maghreb entity.
It the need for trade and investment with the Maghreb region, characteristic of the end of the Cold War, which will lead the U.S. to encourage the Maghreb countries to effectively implement the regional integration, actually far elusive not only because of the rivalry between the countries involved but mostly because of discontent arising from the still unresolved saharian conflict.
Western countries effectively, while promoting this integration through a body such as the Arab Maghreb Union, are resolved to bilateralism relations in the trade and investment fields, regional cooperation is virtually nonexistent. This low level of cooperation is also observed in the field of exchange of information relating to the fight against terrorism.
Thus, it’s in the spirit of promoting economic integration in North Africa that the Eizenstat initiative or economic alliance is launched by the Clinton administration in 1999. It main goal was to improve the relationship between the United States and the Maghreb, by promoting trade and investment, while placing special emphasis on job creation. Mauritania and Libya were excluded, at least for the start. The implementation of this covenant required that the structures within each country be reformed, with a focus on private sector by removing barriers between countries such as closing the border between Algeria and Morocco, anything that prevent trade and investment.
Eizenstat initiative will fail because countries such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia could not agree to speak with one voice to their common partner the United States.
Another U.S. initiative is the first of the Obama administration in December 2010, called: The North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity.
It aims to network the private Maghreb with U.S. companies. The Maghreb countries involved in this project are: Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya.
It also goes in the direction of strengthening relations between the United States and North Africa, based on mutual interests.
This partnership is based on five pillars whose main objective is to actively support the projects of young North Africans and support the entrepreneurial spirit in the region taking into account the fact that there is a real challenge when it comes to youth employment, especially because the unemployed youth of the region represent an ideal target for recruitment by terrorist groups in the region, not to mention illegal immigration.
This networking of young north African entrepreneurs will require effective cooperation of countries in the region. This is why the U.S. administration was keen to involve some north african governments in this partnership.
There are also a number of partnerships between Africa and Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall, that is to say, registering in the logic of globalization.
tension that could justify their intervention in the crisis, alongside Algeria, not really for the “forced” concessions, but to “encourage” by promising compensation interesting one hand, and Moreover, by making him understand that in case of refusal they will have no choice but to support viable proposals, that is to say the other side.
(1) – Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in power from November 7, 1987 following a coup against President Habib Bourguiba in January 14, 2011. His power is accused of corruption and nepotism.
Hosni Mubarak to power in Egypt since 14 October 1981, he won and his regime with a popular revolution in February 11, 2011.
Muammar Gaddafi to power in Libya since the coup of 1979, he was toppled power following a civil war that will take over from the NATO forces in response to resolution 1975 on Libya.
(2) – 1-The self-determination referendum, which would have to lead either to independence or to the attachment of the territory to Morocco, 2 – Framework Law, which advocates the autonomy of the territory; 3 – The partition of the territory, some returning Morocco and the other returning to the Sahrawi, 4 – withdrawal of MINURSO (UN Mission in Western Sahara).
(3) – Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
(4) – See Western Sahara: The Cost of Conflict
Crisis Group, MENA Report No. 65, June 11, 2007
(5) – Because in such a situation, the reactions of both sides in case of even a minor incident are unpredictable. There is currently a real arms race in North Africa. This suggests that an armed conflict between the two countries could not be a small scale.
(6) – The three here are: Morocco, Tunisia and Libya against the Algerian position.
(7)- http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/152435.pdf
(8)- http://www.irenees.net/fr/fiches/analyse/fiche-analyse-18.html
Will changes in recent months following the Arab revolt, lead to a new geopolitical configuration that can remove the conflict of Western Sahara’s characteristic of any major obstacle to intra-regional cooperation?
The Arab Revolt in North Africa has already overthrown the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes. Libya has lived rather an armed uprising. This one has turned into a civil war, with the participation of foreign forces from The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This war will finally overthrow the Gaddafi regime. The common feature of these regimes was their longevity strategy that left little hope for a possible democratic change (1).
Countries such as Morocco and Algeria have experienced problems relating to the revolutionary wave, but no real serious so far.
Knowing that the Libyan regime of Colonel Gaddafi was an informal supporter of the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara conflict, one should expect to see the position of the new libyan regime consistent with that of France and the United States, his supporters in his quest for power.
The Western Sahara conflict is being negotiated since the entry into force of the cease-fire in 1991.
The United States and the European Union are working on making the region an integrated entity since the end of the Cold War, in order to foster better cooperation between the Maghreb and the West in the economic, the military and the security fields. This requires an effective intra-regional cooperation.
Algeria, the Polisario Front support
With approximately 35.6 million inhabitants and an area of 2381 741 km2, the Democratic People’s Republic of Algeria (RADP) is a former French colony, that became independent in July 5, 1962. Located in North Africa as part of the Maghreb, it has as neighbors, Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. It also has a coast on the Mediterranean Sea.
Since its independence acquired after a long struggle against the French colonial power, Algeria has made people self-determination a principle dear. Thus it has supported more or less directly many movements struggle for independence.
This reason that Algeria has often advanced to justify his support for the Polisario Front, at the start of its armed conflict against Morocco in the mid-1970s. Alger also justified his interest in this conflict by the fact that it taking it at it border and therefore requires vigilance.
Algerian support at the beginning of this conflict took the form of a contribution in weapons, logistics, military troops, diplomacy and finance. After the cease-fire in 1991, military aid was reduced, but financial and diplomatic components was strengthened.
Of the four options on the table to resolve this conflict (2), Algeria’s support goes to the organization of a referendum on self-determination of the Saharawi people under the auspices of the United Nations.
Algeria has welcomed Sahrawi refugees on its territory of Tindouf, where it has long erected refugee camps. Indeed, the territory of Western Sahara is divided by a wall of 1500 km erected by Morocco, but many chose to flee the Saharawi territory to reach the refugee camps of Tindouf.
Thus, following the gradual reduction of international assistance in support of the Polisario, Algeria today extends its aid to food, fiscal or monetary. At the international level, the support of Algeria to SADR (3) is characterized by a significant investment in the diplomatic field in order to meet the Moroccan efforts at the same level.
Indeed, to date, the Sharifi kingdom was able to convince countries like the United States, France and Spain that, an independent Sahara (4) will threaten the stability of the kingdom by the fact that Algeria would benefit to besiege Morocco in its southern border, then causing moroccan reaction, concentration of moroccan forces along the border with all the risks of a triggering armed conflict at any time between the two forces (5). Some experts believe that an independent Sahrawi state will need, at least in its early years, a country protection for its security, and this country could be Algeria.
The new position in the Libyan Sahara conflict
The impact of the new configuration on the North African on the Western Sahara conflict could be in the form of three against one (6).
The return on the international stage of Libya had been conditioned by many changes that the Libyan regime had to achieve. Gaddafi had finally resolved to comply with the requirements of the “international community”. The concessions that Gaddafi’s regime has made: Agree to deliver the Libyans accused of being responsible for terrorist acts on American flight over Lockerbie in 1988 and French flight in Niger in 1989. Agree to indemnify the victims’ families. Agree to abandon the program of development and production of weapons of mass destruction under international supervision.
The issue on which this regime was still failing on their eyes was: the establishment of democracy, respect for human rights and its corollaries.
The position of Gaddafi’s Libya has often been that of supporting the Polisario Front in its struggle for self-determination. It is true that in 2006 Libya gave the impression, probably by strategy, to support the position of a Moroccan Sahara. However, by 2009, Libya would become officially neutral on this issue.
The action (albeit not truly verified) for Polisario, to send mercenaries to the Libyan regime in its war against the Libyan National Transition Council, without being a determining factor, could influence the decision of the new government of Libya to support the Moroccan position of autonomy in the Sahara. In reality one should expect that the new Libya aligns it position behind this of NATO members, that is to say supports the Moroccan option of autonomy.
In addition, it will initiate political reforms along the lines of the introduction of democracy, of respect of human rights and its corollaries. It will remain an important partner for the United States and the European Union within the framework of the fight against the terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the Sahel, like Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Algeria.
The challenge of an integrated Maghreb on the Western Sahara conflict.
For Americans who prefer a peaceful resolution of this conflict, its instability has created an environment conducive to terrorism. It’s therefore necessary to solve it for the stability, the security and the prosperity of the region. Indeed, for the United States and the European Union, cooperation between the countries is essential for several reasons. The most important of these reasons being of course the fight against terrorism. The Maghreb is indeed the gateway to Europe and many surveys have shown that terrorist groups operating in Europe also recruit in the Maghreb and European suburbs, heavily populated by North African natives.
Economic trade of policy of globalization require an integration of the region and a stable and secure environment. Thus, the desire for Europe and the United States to practice the trade and invest on a larger scale in the region will not find satisfaction as mistrust continue to create barriers among the member countries. Their policies do not allow a smooth flow of goods and people.
For most of the players, regional as outside, the Saharian conflict is considered the main obstacle to the establishment of a Maghreb entity.
It the need for trade and investment with the Maghreb region, characteristic of the end of the Cold War, which will lead the U.S. to encourage the Maghreb countries to effectively implement the regional integration, actually far elusive not only because of the rivalry between the countries involved but mostly because of discontent arising from the still unresolved saharian conflict.
Western countries effectively, while promoting this integration through a body such as the Arab Maghreb Union, are resolved to bilateralism relations in the trade and investment fields, regional cooperation is virtually nonexistent. This low level of cooperation is also observed in the field of exchange of information relating to the fight against terrorism.
Thus, it’s in the spirit of promoting economic integration in North Africa that the Eizenstat initiative or economic alliance is launched by the Clinton administration in 1999. It main goal was to improve the relationship between the United States and the Maghreb, by promoting trade and investment, while placing special emphasis on job creation. Mauritania and Libya were excluded, at least for the start. The implementation of this covenant required that the structures within each country be reformed, with a focus on private sector by removing barriers between countries such as closing the border between Algeria and Morocco, anything that prevent trade and investment.
Eizenstat initiative will fail because countries such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia could not agree to speak with one voice to their common partner the United States.
Another U.S. initiative is the first of the Obama administration in December 2010, called: The North Africa Partnership for Economic Opportunity.
It aims to network the private Maghreb with U.S. companies. The Maghreb countries involved in this project are: Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and Libya.
It also goes in the direction of strengthening relations between the United States and North Africa, based on mutual interests.
This partnership is based on five pillars whose main objective is to actively support the projects of young North Africans and support the entrepreneurial spirit in the region taking into account the fact that there is a real challenge when it comes to youth employment, especially because the unemployed youth of the region represent an ideal target for recruitment by terrorist groups in the region, not to mention illegal immigration.
This networking of young north African entrepreneurs will require effective cooperation of countries in the region. This is why the U.S. administration was keen to involve some north african governments in this partnership.
There are also a number of partnerships between Africa and Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall, that is to say, registering in the logic of globalization.
tension that could justify their intervention in the crisis, alongside Algeria, not really for the “forced” concessions, but to “encourage” by promising compensation interesting one hand, and Moreover, by making him understand that in case of refusal they will have no choice but to support viable proposals, that is to say the other side.
(1) – Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in power from November 7, 1987 following a coup against President Habib Bourguiba in January 14, 2011. His power is accused of corruption and nepotism.
Hosni Mubarak to power in Egypt since 14 October 1981, he won and his regime with a popular revolution in February 11, 2011.
Muammar Gaddafi to power in Libya since the coup of 1979, he was toppled power following a civil war that will take over from the NATO forces in response to resolution 1975 on Libya.
(2) – 1-The self-determination referendum, which would have to lead either to independence or to the attachment of the territory to Morocco, 2 – Framework Law, which advocates the autonomy of the territory; 3 – The partition of the territory, some returning Morocco and the other returning to the Sahrawi, 4 – withdrawal of MINURSO (UN Mission in Western Sahara).
(3) – Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
(4) – See Western Sahara: The Cost of Conflict
Crisis Group, MENA Report No. 65, June 11, 2007
(5) – Because in such a situation, the reactions of both sides in case of even a minor incident are unpredictable. There is currently a real arms race in North Africa. This suggests that an armed conflict between the two countries could not be a small scale.
(6) – The three here are: Morocco, Tunisia and Libya against the Algerian position.
(7)- http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/152435.pdf
(8)- http://www.irenees.net/fr/fiches/analyse/fiche-analyse-18.html
bring us together, 2/11/2011
